I’ve just begun Carson’s “Christ and Culture Revisited.” It looks to be an interesting read.
Already though we have hit a snag. Carson offers,
“My focus is on how we should be thinking about the relations between Christ and culture now,at the beginning of the twenty first century….Our reflections are shaped by six unique factors,
4.) … debates rage regarding what is ‘cultural’ in ‘multicultural,’ which in turn has precipitated debates over the relative merits of one culture over another. That in turn, of course, feeds into debates over religious claims, since religions, too, under the definition of ‘culture’ already given, are necessarily forms of cultural expressions. What gives a religion, any religion, the right to claim its own superiority or even uniqueness.
The problem here is that Carson has presupposed without establishing that religions are merely forms of cultural expressions. I would contend that the opposite is the case arguing that cultures are merely forms of religious expressions. If we say that religions are necessarily forms of cultural expressions, as if culture is the goose that lays the egg of religion then we run the danger of suggesting that culture is a kind of ultimate starting point. But to make culture an ultimate starting point is to get things backwards since the cult (religion) is that which makes the cultus (culture). If we are to examine culture profitably, as Carson intends to do, then the beginning point is not the culture itself but rather the religion from which the culture springs. And behind the religion of a culture looms the God whom both cult and cultus serve.
Carson’s problem begins to reveal itself even more acutely when just a page later he can speak of ‘secular countries.’ What does Carson mean by this? Does he mean that these are countries and cultures that have never been based on any religions? Such a view would require culture to be seen as something prior to religion and something out of which religion might or might not come. But of course we know that it is not possible to have a a-religious culture and so the whole idea of a “secular country,” or a “secular culture” must be surrendered.
Another sign of looming trouble in Carson’s book is by his early assertion that, “in some ways the world has become more furiously religious.” This cannot be since religion can neither increase nor decreases but can only transmute itself into different forms. Christopher Hitchens is every bit as religious as Osama Bin Laden, and were Hitchens to convert tomorrow to Christianity he would not at that point become “more furiously religious,” just as if Osama Bin Laden decided to walk away from Allah and become an agnostic he wouldn’t become “less furiously religious.” Now, it may be that the world is becoming more furiously epistemologically self conscious about how religious it is but no individual, nor any culture can ever increase or decrease their religious quota.
Carson begins this book by giving a definition of culture that he favors from a gentleman named Clifford Geertz.
“The culture concept…denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitude towards life.”
Now this is fine as far as it goes but the question that begs being asked is, where do the pattern of meanings that are embodied in symbols come from? Sure, they are historically transmitted but the question is where did they originally come from? The answer to that is that they came from the cult (religion) of a people, which itself originated from how the people thought about God.
Bret, you make some good distinctions here, especially noting that “cultures are merely forms of religious expressions,” and noting the danger that “cultures are ultimate starting points.” However, I think that your argument could be helped by stating why you believe the opposite to be true, (why this, too, is a presupposition, and also, in giving evidences for why you believe your own presupposition to be true). Maybe you have outlined such things in the past, in which case, a mere reference or link would be appropriate.
Where I don’t follow you is here: “religion can neither increase nor decreases but can only transmute itself into different forms. Christopher Hitchens is every bit as religious as Osama Bin Laden, and were Hitchens to convert tomorrow to Christianity he would not at that point become “more furiously religious,” just as if Osama Bin Laden decided to walk away from Allah and become an agnostic he wouldn’t become ‘less furiously religious.'”
In individuals, especially the second case, I think it would be fair to say that if Bin Laden stopped being an Islamist fanatic, that he truely could be said to be “less religious.” (Such a characterization deals more with practice than “philosophical underpinning,” and while I know that this, too, is one of your own philosophical underpinnings, I think it is much less clear than the first.
John,
Osama would not become ‘less religious’ because his life would still be completely organized around religion just as everybody else’s is. Now, Obama could become less violent but that would only be due to the fact that his religion would be informing him that excessive violence is not acceptable. Once again, all of us are equally religious.
If you go to the category of culture at Ironink you will find 48 entries on culture. I am sure that one of those will explain why I say that ‘cultures are ultimate starting points.’
Thanks for stopping by,
Bret